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Abstract
During the last twenty years, we have witnessed the deep development of digital
technologies. Artificial intelligence, software and algorithms have started to
impact more and more frequently in our daily lives and most people didn’t notice
it. Recently, economists seem to have perceived that this new technological wave
could have some consequences, but which one are they? Will they be positive
or negative? In this paper we try to give a possible answer to these questions
through an agent based computational approach; more specifically we enriched
the large-scale macroeconomics model EURACE with the concept of digital
technologies in order to investigate the effect that their business dynamics have
at a macroeconomic level. Our preliminary results show that this productivity
increase could be a double-edged sword: notwithstanding the development of
the digital technologies sector can create new job opportunities, at the same
time, these products could jeopardize the employment inside the traditional
mass-production system.
Keywords: Intangible assets, Industry 4.0, Digital revolution, Agent-based
macroeconomics
1. Introduction
During the course of history, several technological evolutions have changed
and influenced the lives of human beings. In this paper we focus our attention
on the impact of the digital transformation on the production systems and, as
a consequence, we evaluate the potential variation of the employment rate in
the long term. According to Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014), we are facing
“The Second Machine Age” that is revolutionizing our world. In particular, the
authors argue that probably one of the most important technological discov-
eries has been the steam engine perfected by John Watt in the second half of
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the eighteenth century which allowed to produce a huge amount of mechanical
energy. After that, there have been further technological developments which
impacted on our production systems and, thanks to electronics and information
technology, in the second half of the twentieth century the assembly lines have
been largely automated. Nowadays, we are facing a new technological wave, in
fact, digital technologies have been the subject of an intense improvement and
the possible consequences of this productivity enhancement make economists
reflect. The substantial difference between digital technologies and industrial
automation is that while the latter helps human beings to overcome the limits
linked to physical force, thanks to the former we can surmount the limits im-
posed by our mind.
At this point, a question arises spontaneously: what will be the consequences
of the advent of these new digital technologies on jobs? According to Acemoglu
and Restrepo (2017a,b, 2018a,b,c), AI and robotics, as automation, replace hu-
man beings in jobs that they previously performed, creating a “displacement
effect”. One of the most important aspects consists in the fact that, while
technology until our days has impacted principally on workplaces occupied by
“blue-collars” workers, now these kind of instruments probably will affect the
so called “white-collars” workers.
Furthermore, it’s really interesting to notice how the business dynamics re-
lated to the companies which develop and produce digital technologies are com-
pletely different compared to the economic dynamics that characterized mass-
productions. As a matter of fact, Arthur (1989, 1990, 1994, 1999b) distinguishes
between two different worlds: a mass-production world, characterized by dimin-
ishing returns, in which products are heavy on resources and light on knowledge
and a knowledge-based world that, on the contrary, is characterized by increas-
ing returns. In this particular reality, which regards high-tech producers, prod-
ucts require a deep know-how and scarce quantity of resources; in other words,
this companies have high R&D fixed costs compared to their variable production
costs. Furthermore, always according to Arthur, the world ruled by increasing
return presents several other characteristics as network effect, path dependence,
market instability, unexpectedness, winner-take-all and technological lock-in.
These features are being studied in a field called Complexity Economics which,
unlike the standard economic theory, emphasizes interaction among economic
agents through an out-of-equilibrium approach, see Elsner et al. (2014); Arthur
(1999a, 2014); Fontana (2010).
Agent-based modelling represents the best approach in order to address these
aspects, see Gallegati (2018); North and Macal (2007); Hommes and LeBaron
(2018), and for this reason we use this tool to conduct our analysis. In par-
ticular, we enrich a pre-existent large-scale macroeconomics model: EURACE,
see Mazzocchetti et al. (2018); Ponta et al. (2018); Raberto et al. (2012); Teglio
et al. (2012). The concept of innovation has already been deeply investigated
through the agent based modelling, see e.g Pyka et al. (2010); Dosi et al. (2010);
Caiani et al. (2018); Fanti (2018); Dawid and Reimann (2011). The EURACE
model as well has been endowed with the concept of innovation, that refers to
tangible capital goods, see Dawid et al. (2008). However, our research interest
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is different and focuses on innovation from an other perspective: the productiv-
ity increase provided by intangible digital capital goods. Software, algorithms,
artificial intelligence and their developers represent the subject of our study
and, as a matter of fact, we want to link the new concept of innovation to the
“digital revolution”, see Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2011). So, the introduction
of digital technologies inside the EURACE model represents the attempt to re-
produce the advent inside the economy of Industry 4.0 according to which not
only the production processes are automated, but also decisions start to be sub-
ject to automation technology, see Kang et al. (2016); Parrott and Lane (2017);
Cotteleer and Sniderman (2017). The new EURACE model features about the
production of digital intangible Technologies are presented in Section 2. Section
3 shows our preliminary computational results. Conclusion and remarks are
provided in Section 4.
2. Modeling the digital economy
2.1. Outline of the basic EURACE model
The base version of the stock-flow consistent EURACE model includes sev-
eral agent populations, in particular it incorporates: consumption goods pro-
ducers (CGPs), that manufacture a homogeneous consumption good; a capital
good producer (KGP), which produces means of production (for instance ma-
chine tools); households (HHs), that perform as workers, financial investors and
consumers; commercial banks (Bs) and two policy makers: the government (G)
and the central bank (CB), responsible for fiscal and monetary policy, respec-
tively. To address the issue of the consequences of the new technological wave on
the economy the intangible digital assets developers (DADs) agents have been
included in the model.
The graphical representation of the present EURACE model in terms of
agent classes (ellipses or rectangles) and current account monetary flows (ar-
rows) is shown in Fig. 1. Rectangles are used when just one instance of the
class is considered in the model, whereas ellipses are intended to represent the
presence of multiple heterogeneous instances of the agent class. The yellow
background refers to the newly introduced agent. The arrows represent the
current account flows.
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The agents interacts through different decentralized and centralized artificial
markets; the former for consumption and capital goods, labor, housing and
credit, whereas the latter for firms (or banks) stocks and government bonds.
Bounded rationality and limited capabilities of computation and information
gathering characterize agents’ behaviour; see Teglio et al. (2017); Ozel et al.
(2019); Raberto et al. (2018) for a detailed description concerning markets and
comportment of agents. Furthermore, as underlined in Ponta et al. (2018) the
Stock-Flow-consistency represents a distinctive feature of the EURACE model;
in fact each agent has its own balance sheet which includes the details regarding
assets and liabilities, see Godley and Lavoie (2016); Godin and Caverzasi (2014);
Ponta et al. (2018).
2.2. Intangible digital assets
As said above, in the present study, the EURACE model is characterized
by a new class of productive capital which is represented by intangible digital
assets, say software or any other digitalized knowledge-based assets, e.g., algo-
rithms, advanced routines, instructions. These new capital assets are developed
and supplied by a new class of agents, namely the intangible digital assets de-
veloper (DAD), and are employed in the production process by CGPs with the
purpose of rising total factor productivity. Intangible digital assets are hetero-
geneous among the different DADs active in the economy, depending on their
accumulated digital knowledge, which increases over time based on the R&D
investments made. Obviously, this new type of asset implies the existence of a
novel digital market, in which DADs can potentially compete.
2.3. Supply side
In line with the literature on intangible capital, see e.g. Haskel and Westlake
(2017), we assume that intangible digital assets are non-rivalrous, i.e., they
are characterized by zero marginal production costs. In particular, production
costs are actually given only by the R&D costs, which are determined by the
cumulated labor costs of the skilled labor force employed at any DAD agent.
On a monthly basis, each DAD agent d has a chance to develop a new version
of its digital capital asset which is characterized by higher knowledge content,
then more productivity when employed in the production process by CGPs. The
probability probd of a successful completion of development of the new digital
asset version is set to depend on the cumulated person months Md employed by
the DAD since the latest version development, as follows:
probd = 1− 1
1 + ηMd
(1)
where η is a shape parameter, homogeneous across all DAD agents, setting the
development speed, i.e., the higher is η, the higher is the probability to develop
an improved version of digital assets, for any level of cumulated person months
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Md employed. The rationale behind the shape of Eq. 1 is to set the probabil-
ity as an increasing monotone function of cumulated human efforts devoted to
R&D but with decreasing returns to scale. It is also worth noting that R&D
is modelled here as an uncertain activity whose positive outcome, i.e., a higher
level of knowledge reached by the DAD, then leading to an improved version of
its produced digital asset, is never granted in principle, since the probability is
equal to 1 only asymptotically for an infinite number of person months. DADs
determine the number of employees monthly according to their revenues, pre-
cisely the hiring of workers represents a fraction of the DADs monthly turnover.
Obviously, this means that the number of employees in the DADs sector is in-
fluenced not only by revenues, but also by the average wage characterizing the
economy.
2.4. Demand side
Intangible digital assets are demanded by CGPs which pay a user license to
DADs for their utilization. According to the model design, every CGP adopts
one intangible digital technology at a time, i.e., its digital assets in use are sup-
plied by only one DAD. The knowledge level of the employed digital technology
sets the total factor productivity of the CGP. In particular, along the lines of
Teglio et al. (2017), we consider the labor force Nf , employed at any CGP f , and
its physical capital endowment Kf , as the production factors employed for the
production of consumption goods qCf , according to a Cobb-Douglas technology,
i.e.,
qCf = γfN
α
f K
β
f , (2)
where α and β are the production elasticity parameters and γf is the total
factor productivity. An important novelty with respect to the baseline EURACE
model is that γf is not anymore an homogeneous constant across all the CGPs
but a variable, specific to each CGP, which increases over time based on the
knowledge content κd of the digital asset adopted by each CGP, i.e., the digital
knowledge level reached by its supplying DAD agent. In particular, total factor
productivity γf is modelled as follows:
γf = exp(1 + ηγκd) (3)
where the knowledge level κd is an integer variable whereas ηγ is a scale param-
eter, homogeneous across all CGPs.
For the right of use of its intangible digital technology, a DAD agent d charges
CGP f a monthly amount of money proportional to the level of capital endow-
ment Kf of CGP f , i.e., an amount equal to pDdKf , where pDd , set by the
DAD agent, could be considered as a user license unit price. The rationale of
this modelling feature is that, even if intangible digital assets are non-rivalrous,
then replicable many times at no additional cost irrespective of the size of the
CGP’s capital, the related services of installation, maintenance, and assistance,
which we assume are provided by DADs as well, are an increasing monotone
function of the size of capital stock. For instance, often the price of software
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licenses depends on the number of computers where it is installed. For the sake
of simplicity, we state that this dependence is linear and that the DAD agent
simply charges a unit license cost pDd multiplied by the size of physical capital,
say computers, or more generally physical machines that can be automatized
and then made more productive by means of intangible digital technology.
On a monthly basis, the CGP has a given exogenous probability probf to con-
sider the adoption of a different digital technology, i.e., to assess costs and
benefits of switching from the present digital supplier d to another one d∗. In
particular, the cost-benefit analysis consists in computing the net present value
(NPV) of expected net future cash flows that the CGP would get with the
switch, as follows:
NPVd∗ =
pCf (q
∗
Cf
− qCf )
rD
+
(pDd − pDd∗ )Kf
rD
− wNˆf , (4)
where the first term gives the present value of the gain (loss) in future revenues,
the second addend is given by difference between the user license unit price of the
new digital technology under consideration and the one currently in adoption,
the third and final term takes into account the training costs that the firm
would face for its personnel to manage the new digital technology. In particular,
the first addend of Eq. 4 is intended to take into account that the difference
in productivity between the two technologies, see Eq. 3, implies an expected
different production level, given the present endowment of production factors,
labor and capital, according to Eq. 2, then different expected future revenues1.
In addition, the second term of Eq. 4 takes into account the difference in
the user license equation bill. In this respect, the CGP usually faces a trade-off
between expected higher (lower) future revenues due to a more (less) productive
alternative digital technology and higher (lower) costs for the digital services
provided by the DAD, since higher (lower) productivity of the digital asset are
usually accompanied with higher (lower) unit user license price, as outlined in
the next section.
2.5. Digital asset price dynamics
CGPs pay monthly the unit license price to the reference DAD. In order to
endow DADs with a competitive comportment, we implement an active pricing
mechanism which can possibly be turned off. Consequently, the absence or
presence of this dynamics allows us to evaluate two different situations: a case
of price collusion, in which DADs jointly decide to adopt the same user unit
license price pDd , that we call “Passive pricing” case, and a price war scenario
characterized by aggressive and competitive behaviours which we call “Active
pricing” case. In both cases, the license price is proportional to the average
wage w which characterized the macroeconomic system. This modelling choice
1The implicit assumption made here is that all consumption goods will be sold at the
present price pCf
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is related to the R&D activity performed by the various digital firms; as a
matter of fact, in order to develop and produce their products, they need to
hire researchers whose wages will constitute the costs incurred by them. So, for
this reason, we link the cost structure to the revenue structure. Moreover, for
the same reason, we assume that the training cost per worker is equal to w,
see Eq. 4. The user license unit price pDd for every DAD in case of “Passive
pricing” follows this relation:
pDd = λw (5)
where λ, in case of “Passive pricing”, is an exogenous and homogeneous param-
eter , while in the other case it can increase or decrease over time according to
an exogenous parameter δ; the positive or negative contribution of the latter
depends on the number of sold licenses: if the DAD finds an increase in sales, it
decides to enhance the price, otherwise it opts for a price reduction in order to
assume a better market position. In fact, as shown in the Eq. 4, the user license
unit price could determine the transition from a certain digital technologies to
a cheaper one. So, in case of “Active pricing”, λ assumes a heterogeneous and
variable connotation.
2.6. Employees digital technologies skills
As regards the employees, the third term of the Eq. 4 is related to the train-
ing costs which a company should support in order to make workers operational
with the alternative digital technologies. Every worker is endowed with a set of
“digital technologies” skills, that can be as large as the number of DADs present
in the economy. These skills represent the employee ability to handle the dif-
ferent types of digital assets and the possibility to expand this set is linked to
the training courses provided by the DADs; so, from a financial perspective the
gain for DADs comes from two different activities: the selling of licenses and
the training courses. From a modelling point of view, the training costs for the
company are given by the number of workers without the “digital technologies”
skill taken into account (Nˆf ) multiplied by the training cost per worker (w).
The lower these costs, the higher the probability to adopt a new kind of digital
assets. As a matter of fact, with this particular micro-assumption, we want to
model the presence inside EURACE macro-economy of a network effect related
to the transition from digital technologies less widespread to others more dif-
fused. In fact, companies virtually benefit from the ”digital technologies” skill
of their workers and this precisely happens when they are valuing a possible
digital assets change: higher the number of workers with that particular skill,
lower the transition costs to that alternative digital technologies which could be
cheaper or more productive.
The continuous turnover characterizing the EURACE labour market helps the
diffusion of the predominant digital technologies reflected on the long term in-
side the economy by the number of workers with that “digital technologies”
skill. Obviously, not only companies can benefit from the skills acquired by
their workers in case of a digital technology transition but, at the same time,
DADs can profit from employees skills: the higher the number of workers able
to use their digital assets, the higher the probability to sell their products.
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3. Computational results
3.1. Design of experiments
The new EURACE model features allow us to analyze various scenarios. In
particular, we consider two different digital assets pricing scenarios: in the first
named “passive pricing”, DADs sell their licenses at the same price, determined
as a fixed share of the nominal wage; in the second, henceforth “active pricing”
scenario, we endowed the firm with the possibility to raise or decrease indepen-
dently their license prices; the choice between these two options depends on the
market share owned by them: the bigger the share, the higher the price and vice
versa, as outlined in the previous section. In order to conduct an in-depth anal-
ysis, we explore the two cases previously described with six different values of
η, the parameter which controls the probability to develop an improved version
of the digital asset, see Eq. 1; in this way we obtain twelve different scenarios.
The methodology of our study is based on Monte Carlo computational exper-
iments: each scenario is simulated with twenty different seeds of the pseudo
random number generator. So, a total of 240 simulations has been considered
in order to conduct our investigation. Obviously, all the parameters are identi-
cal across the different scenarios except for η. The computational results shown
in the following subsections, in accordance with the methodology used, are pre-
sented in the form of boxplots, an ordinary mode to present data distribution. In
particular, each boxplot shows the distribution of the time averages of relevant
variables over twenty years long time interval, concerning the twenty simula-
tions characterized by different seeds. Boxes enclose the values from the first to
the third quartile; they also comprehend whiskers that extend up to minimum
and the maximum data points not considered outliers; the horizontal segments
inside boxes represent the median of the distribution. Moreover, in order to
give a complete overview of the model response, we plot also the time series of
the most important variables of interest, so to show the trend during the entire
twenty years long simulation; all time series considered refer to a specific seed.
Our analysis aims to investigate the behavior of DADs at a micro level in order to
verify the possible existence of the phenomena that characterize the “Increasing-
returns World”; at the same time, it leads us also to asses the impact of this
new industrial sector at the macro level.
3.2. “Active pricing” and “Passive pricing” business dynamics analysis
As we can see in Fig. 2(a), “active pricing” scenarios are characterized by
higher values of total factor productivity (γf ) compared to the “passive pric-
ing” ones, independently of the value of η; this is due to the higher unit user
license price pDd (whose distribution is reported in Fig. 2(b)), that in case
of “active pricing” can be managed by the DADs in order to increase their
revenues. Higher turnover does not necessarily involve higher R&D intensity,
represented by the person months employed by the DAD, because, as already
explained in the previous section, we link the cost structure to the revenues
structure through the average wage w, see Eq. 5. So, the variable that effec-
tively affects the R&D intensity is λ, which in case of “passive pricing” is fixed
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throughout the simulation, while in the other case varies according to the DAD
pricing strategy. In presence of “active pricing”, the average value of λ results
to be higher, see Fig. 4(b), and this fact leads to a higher employment inside
the DADs industrial sector (see Fig. 2(c)), and as a consequence to a greater
average γf . At the same time, obviously γf increases with η which sets the
Figure 2: The figure shows a series of boxplots representing, for any values of η and for any
pricing scenario considered, the distribution of: the average total factor productivity γf (a),
the average unit user license price pDd (b), the employment in the DADs industrial sector
(c), the Herfindahl market power index (d). Each boxplot reports the distribution of the time
averages over twenty years long time period for each one of the twenty seeds considered.
size of R&D intensity inside the DADs. It is very important to note that the
competition between DADs, related to the possibility of freely managing the
price of their licenses leads to an increase in the average price itself compared
to the “passive pricing” case, but, at the same time, it involves a higher quality
of digital capital assets for the consumption good producers, which is reflected
by γf . In fact, in the “passive pricing” case, DADs are limited in hiring new
researchers because of their lower λ and obviously this fact implies a lower pro-
ductivity for their digital assets. Furthermore, the competition between DADs
established by the “active pricing” is accentuated by η; indeed the user license
unit price (pDd) decreases as η enhances. At the same time, notwithstanding
the average price decreases in case of high values of η, the market concentration
increases2, as it is visible in Fig. 2(d). This emerging phenomenon, that we call
2to represent the market concentration we use a standard measure: the Herfindahl index,
see Kwoka (1985)
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“converse concentration effect” appears in contradiction with the standard wis-
dom, according to which competitive markets, characterized by lower prices, are
not concentrated. In this case, the competition represented by lower prices and
consequently by lower values of λ, arises in order to contrast the market concen-
tration that characterize the “Increasing-returns World” in which, by exploiting
the right wave, a firm can lock-in the market. What stimulates the emergence
of a product on others, and consequently the birth of market concentration, is
competitiveness; after acquiring the highest market share, the leader company
can afford to raise its price but always in agreement with the value perceived
by the customer (related to the productivity and price). At the same time the
other competitors, in order to gain market shares, tend to decrease their product
prices. The results is a reduction of the average price. It is very important to
note that the productivity (which represents the digital asset quality inside the
model) and the “right price” combined together are the key to the company’s
success. On the other hand, in the “passive pricing” scenario, the Herfindahl
index turns out to be high for each value of η; it happens because in this case
only the “fortune” leads to a market lock-in and not a decision-making strategy.
In particular, the “fortune” is represented by the randomness related to Eq. 1
which is not counterbalanced by any “active pricing” strategy. Going further
with the analysis, the high employment in the digital technologies sector, in case
of “active pricing”, seems to represent the transition from a mass-production
economy to an high-tech services economy. The “Displacement effect” in the
consumption goods industrial sector, due to the enhancement of productivity of
the digital assets, is contrasted by the creation of new jobs in the sector of the
DADs. This behavior is clearly visible in Fig. 3 (a) and (b) where the employ-
ment concerning the DADs industrial sector increases over time, while CGPs
hire less and less employees because of the high digital assets productivity (or
Total factor productivity γf ). As a matter of fact, it represents what Acemoglu
calls the “Productivity effect”: the higher demand for labor from the digital
technologies industrial sector contrasts the “Displacement effect” generated by
the digital transformation of the economy. Notwithstanding the creation of
these new job opportunities, at the same time, for high level of γf DADs are
not able to absorb all the unemployment created by their digital assets; Fig.
4(a) shows an increase of unemployment caused by the enhancement of η over
time in both cases. It is interesting to note that for the first two values of η
(0.05 and 0.1) the unemployment is higher in case of “passive pricing”; this is
related to the fact that until these values, in case of “active pricing”, DADs can
absorb the unemployment caused by their digital assets. Beyond those values,
the “displacement effect” is too high; in fact, we can see a significant difference
between average productivity in the two cases, see Fig. 2(a). As we can see in
Fig. 4 (c), the total number of licenses sold decreases with η both in case of
“active” and passive “pricing“; logically, this is due to the higher value of γf
which involves a lower stock of capital goods for the same output. Accordingly
to the trend of γf , in case of “passive pricing” the number of licenses is higher
compared to the “active pricing” case.
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Figure 3: The figure displays various time series in case of “active pricing” and η = 0.3; in
particular it shows: the percentage (a) and number of employees (b) in the various industrial
sectors: consumption good producers (CGPs), capital good producer (KGP), digital assets
developers (DADs); total unemployment (c) and average Total factor productivity (d). All
time series refer to a specific seed.
3.3. Competitiveness in the ”active pricing” case
In this subsection, we present a micro-analysis concerning the competitive
dynamics involving the digital assets industrial sector in the “Active pricing”
case. Fig. 5 displays the trend of the most important variables related to the
DADs already mentioned above. It is very interesting to notice that a company
assumes a leading market position; the emergence of this DAD on others is due
to its chance to innovate, which allows it to develop technologies with a higher
productivity. Despite the attempt of other DADs to regain the market shares
lost, which becomes increasingly considerable, through a decrease of their li-
cense prices, on the long-term the leader DAD has deeply improved its product
and this means that the higher productivity of its digital assets covers the price
difference with other products. Furthermore, Fig. 5 shows that, notwithstand-
ing DAD2 has a higher number of users (that are CGPs) compared to DAD3,
this latter has sold (or renewed) a higher number of licenses in the middle of
the simulation, which is linked directly to the capital stocks of user companies;
this is what really makes the difference because revenues depend on licenses and
not on users in general. This fact underlines the importance to have stable cus-
tomers and also that a possible growth of them, from an economic perspective,
could determine a growth of the high-tech producer itself. So the model shows
an interdependence between the two different industrial sectors. This means
that a potential slowing-down in the CGPs economic activity could determine
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Figure 4: The figure shows a series of boxplots representing, for any values of η and for any
pricing scenario considered, the distribution of: unemployment (%) (a), average λ (b) and
total number of licenses in the economy (c). Each boxplot reports the distribution of the time
averages over twenty years long time period for each one of the twenty seeds considered.
accordingly a deceleration in the DADs activity and this fact highlights, in a
certain way, the vulnerability of the digital technologies sector. In other words,
CGPs sustain DADs helping them to innovate their products and, at the same
time, CGPs, in order to be more productive and competitive, need digital assets.
The interaction between these two industrial sectors highlights the complexity
of the intangible digital economy.
3.4. The digital economy from a macroeconomic perspective
As shown in Fig. 6(d), the consumption good price level decreases with high
values of η; this trend is related to the augmentation with η of the average total
factor productivity γf which saves both capital and labor force, as we can see
from the higher unemployment and from the lower number of licenses sold (see
Fig. 4 (a) and (c)). Moreover, a positive impact on consumption goods price is
made by lower average unit user license price pDd , as it is shown in Fig. 2 (b); the
average wage, which influences the consumption goods price, notwithstanding
shows a diminution, does not appear to be significantly affected by η, see Fig.
6 (c). At the same time, the figure shows an important difference between
the two cases considered, in fact the average wage is much higher in case of
“active pricing”. In agreement with the several variables of interest, the passive
pricing case shows lower consumption goods prices. In accordance with this last
variable behavior, which determine an enhancement of households purchasing
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Figure 5: The figure displays various time series in case of “active pricing” and η = 0.3; in
particular it shows: number of licenses (a), number of users (b), unit user license price pDd
(c) and total factor productivity γf (d) of the three different digital assets developers
power, the real sales increase with η; the greater average wage causes, in case
of “active pricing”, higher real sales compared to the other case, see Fig. 6(b).
The decrease of the central bank interest rate with the enhancement of η shows
the intent of the policy maker to increase the employment, see Fig. 6 (a).
4. Conclusion
The computational results presented in the paper are able to capture the
essence related to the new digital technologies world and the stylized facts
that characterize the existing literature. Furthermore, the economic dynam-
ics emerged from the simulations shows interesting properties both at the micro
and at the macro levels, which can be a valid food for thought. The existing
differences between active and passive pricing point out very interesting aspects.
Both cases lead to the success of a company with respect to competitors but,
in case of “active pricing”, competitiveness stimulates the development of more
productive digital assets and a higher employment inside the industrial sector
of digital assets producers. The “converse concentration effect” shows that very
concentrated markets present lower average license prices due to “aggressive”
decision-making strategies. In other words, this phenomenon leads to “compet-
itive concentrations” in the digital world. The effect of digital technologies on
the labour market seems to be crucial about the real possible consequences of
this new technological wave which could transform considerably the economy,
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Figure 6: The figure shows a series of boxplots representing, for any values of η and for any
pricing scenario considered, the distribution of: Central bank interest rate (a), real sales (b),
average wage (c), consumption good price level (d). Each boxplot reports the distribution
of the time averages over twenty years long time period for each one of the twenty seeds
considered.
in particular from an employment perspective. In case of “Active pricing” the
model highlights a clear economic transformation in which the industrial sector
of mass-production replaces workers with increasingly productive technologies,
while the digital assets producers hire workers in order to develop and improve
these technologies. Nevertheless, the unemployment increases in the long-term
within the model because of the increasing digital assets productivity. Probably,
we should see these results as a warning for our society, that, in order to main-
tain a social stability, must be prepared to this new technological wave, whose
impact is not yet well assessable. The education system will play a crucial role
because it will have the task of forming the new generation of “digital workers”.
This could ensure in the future a smoother transition towards the “real” digital
revolution which probably we’re just experiencing; in this way people will be
prepared to new job position in digital services and manufacturing. Our next
research will focus on the study of government policies, concerning social welfare
and education, which could facilitate and promote the transition to the future
digital world.
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